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RECENT DECISIONS

TAXATION - TAXING INCOME FROM SHORT-TERM FAMILY TRUST TO
SE'ITLOR - In 1931 a settlor executed a deed of trust and transferred securities
to the trustees, who were also the settlor's lawyers. The trustees were to pay
the income to the settlor's wife, children and mother-in-law. The duration of
the trust was six years and sixteen days, but it was provided that the trust would
terminate before that time if the settlor or his wife died. At the termination of
the trust the corpus was to be returned to the settlor. The settlor reserved no
power to remove the trustees or to modify or revoke the trust or to control the
management of the trust property. The commissioner of internal revenue sought
to tax the income of the trust for the years 1934 and 1935 as income of the
settlor although the trust was not created to satisfy any legal obligations of the
settlor. Held, the net income of the trust is taxable to the settlor under section
22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934.1 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Barbour, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 165.
In Helvenng v. Clifford 2 it was decided that the income of an irrevocable

1 Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 686 (1934), 26 U.S. C.
(1934), § 22(a), includes within "gross income" all "gains, profits, and income derived • • • from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings
in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever." The same provision was re-enacted in 49 Stat.
L. 1657 (1936); 52 Stat. L. 457 (1938); 53 Stat. L. 9 (1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp.
1939), § 22a.
2 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
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short-term trust could be taxed to the settlor because he was the owner of the
corpus within the meaning of section 22(a).3 In the Clifford case the facts
differed from those of the principal case in that the term of the trust was five
years and that the settlor-husband was the trustee and as trustee had unrestricted
power to invest, to pledge, and to mortgage the trust res. According to that case,
the settlor is the owner of the corpus within the meaning of section 22 (a) unless
the trust effects a substantial change in the settlor's economic position and in his
dominion and control of the corpus.4 The inquiry here is whether the facts of the
principal case place it within the doctrine enunciated in the Clifford case.5 The
difference in the years of duration of the trusts involved in the two cases is
relatively insignificant. However, a ten-year trust has been held not to be
within the doctrine of the Clifford case.6 But a substantial difference exists between the facts of the Clifford case and those of the principal case in that the
settlor in the present case retained no control or rights of management under the
trust agreement. 1 Certainly it is much more difficult to disregard the trust and
consider the settlor as the owner when he has stripped himself of all dominion
over the trust res. Moreover, it is difficult to assume that the trustee will always
respect the wishes of the settlor as to the management of the property merely
because the property will shortly revert to the settlor. This case must therefore
be regarded as an extension of the doctrine of the Clifford case in the taxation
of short-term trusts. In the light of the Jonas case 8 and the principal case, it is
apparent that the present emphasis is on the time element and the relationship
of the settlor to the beneficiaries of the trust. 9
William H. Shipley
8

Compare with Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 60 S. Ct. 551 (1940).
"For where the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs, it
may well make but little difference to him ( except income-tax-wise) where portions
of that income are routed-so long as it stays in the family group." Helvering T.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 at 336, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
5
For discussions of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940),
see 38 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1940); 53 HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1940); 49 YALE L. J.
1305 (1940); 24 MINN. L. REV. 1005 (1940); Ray, "The Income Tax on Short
Term and Revocable Trusts," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1322 (1940); PAUL, STUDIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES 194 (1941).
•
6
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jonas, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d)
169.
'I The court felt that the settlor could control the corpus, since the trustees would
respect his wishes because the trustees realized that within a short time the settlor
would repossess the corpus by the terms of the trust. Principal case, 1.22 F. (2d) 165 at
166-167.
8
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jonas, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d)
169, held that a ten-year trust was not within the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U. S. 344, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
9
This emphasis on the time element may be questioned in light of the refusal
of Congress to adopt legislation to tax the income of a trust for a term of years.
HEARINGS ON H. R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d sess., p. 151 (1934); H. REP. 1385, 73d
Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 24.
4

